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Background: The low quality of healthcare and the presence of user fees in Burkina Faso contribute to low
utilization of healthcare and elevated levels of mortality. To improve access to high-quality healthcare and equity,
national authorities are testing different intervention arms that combine performance-based financing with
community-based health insurance and pro-poor targeting. There is a need to evaluate the implementation of
these unique approaches. We developed a research protocol to analyze the conditions that led to the emergence
of these intervention arms, the fidelity between the activities initially planned and those conducted, the implementation
and adaptation processes, the sustainability of the interventions, the possibilities for scaling them up, and their ethical
implications.
Methods/Design: The study adopts a longitudinal multiple case study design with several embedded levels of
analyses. To represent the diversity of contexts where the intervention arms are carried out, we will select three
districts. Within districts, we will select both primary healthcare centers (n =18) representing different intervention
arms and the district or regional hospital (n =3). We will select contrasted cases in relation to their initial performance
(good, fair, poor). Over a period of 18 months, we will use quantitative and qualitative data collection and analytical
tools to study these cases including in-depth interviews, participatory observation, research diaries, and questionnaires.
We will give more weight to qualitative methods compared to quantitative methods.
Discussion: Performance-based financing is expanding rapidly across low- and middle-income countries. The results of
this study will enable researchers and decision makers to gain a better understanding of the factors that can influence
the implementation and the sustainability of complex interventions aiming to increase healthcare quality as well
as equity.
Keywords: Performance-based financing, Community-based health insurance, User fee exemption, Equity,
Burkina Faso, Implementation study, Process evaluation, Case study methodology, Research protocolBackground
Universal health coverage entails that everyone should
have access to good quality healthcare services without
experiencing financial hardship resulting from healthcare
payment [1]. Despite major healthcare reforms in many
low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), access to* Correspondence: valery.ridde@umontreal.ca
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LMICs, the maternal mortality ratio is 230 for 100,000 live
births and the mortality ratio for children under the age of
5 is 53 per 1,000 [2,3]. Meager improvements have led
to heated international debates on the best policies to
improve access to quality healthcare services and reduce
health inequity.
Recently, numerous LMICs have introduced perform-
ance-based financing (PBF) to improve the delivery of
healthcare services. The World Bank, for instance, sup-
ported the design and implementation of PBF in over 30td. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
Ridde et al. Implementation Science 2014, 9:149 Page 2 of 12
http://www.implementationscience.com/content/9/1/149LMICs [4,5]. Different PBF labels exist and are associated
with different types of incentives and payment arrange-
ments [6,7]. PBF generally entails that performance agree-
ments between Ministries of Health and healthcare
facilities are established to define indicators and targets to
be reached in delivering these services. According to the
model proposed by the World Bank, bonus payments to
health providers are made after verification by reviewers
of the quantity and quality of healthcare services. Across
settings, facilities retain different degrees of autonomy in
deciding how to use PBF payments. The underlying as-
sumption of PBF is that financial incentives, combined
with increased supervision and enhanced autonomy, will
motivate health providers to improve the quantity and
quality of services delivered [8].
The body of evidence on the implementation and
effectiveness of PBF is not well established. In Rwanda, for
instance, PBF increased the number of assisted deliveries,
children's consultations, and perceived quality of care
[9,10]. Meanwhile, in Democratic Republic of Congo, PBF
resulted in lower out-of-pocket payments for patients
while receiving equal or better quality care compared to
those in the control group [11]. On the other hand, a
Cochrane systematic review [12] and a literature review
found that several dimensions of PBF have not yet been
adequately studied (e.g., impact on equity, organizational
change, stakeholder satisfaction) [8,13]. The difficulties
associated with the PBF program in Uganda demonstrated
the importance of considering the context and the imple-
mentation process [14]. These difficulties included the
lack of consideration of other health programs implemen-
ted simultaneously, insufficient communication between
stakeholders, overly rapid selection of performance indica-
tors, inability to modify inappropriate indicators over time,
implementation delays causing institutional memory loss,
limited ability of auditors to identify and tally contract-
relevant services, overwhelming workload of extracting
performance data, insufficient feedback meetings, and fi-
nancial shortfalls [14].
Researchers have suggested that several dimensions
must be taken into account when evaluating any PBF
intervention, including the characteristics of the health-
care system. Most studies on PBF focus on primary
healthcare facilities. Local stakeholders have highlighted
the need to examine the implementation process of PBF
in higher level health facilities. Other elements to be con-
sidered include the governance structure, organizational
cultures, training activities, nature of contracts, redistri-
bution of incentives, indicators of performance, mecha-
nisms to monitor performance, means of dialogue between
stakeholders, power relations, community involvement,
and perceptions of stakeholders [8,15-17].
In addition, one must consider that PBF can also trigger
unintended processes and effects. Financial incentivesmight erode intrinsic motivation [18] or lead to the neg-
lect of non-incentivized services, as observed in Latin
America and Rwanda [19,20]. Other risks include the
migration of health personnel to better performing health
centers, provision of healthcare to easily accessible popu-
lations, a decrease in the quality of care, a reduction in
transfers of patients to other health facilities, and manipu-
lating data regarding performance (gaming) [15].
Combining supply- and demand-side interventions
Achieving universal health coverage will likely require a
comprehensive approach that simultaneously tackles
supply-side and demand-side barriers to effective health-
care coverage. Offering financial incentives to motivate
healthcare providers may not be sufficient to tackle all
the barriers that influence access to healthcare (e.g., user
fees). Without making specific provisions for the poor,
PBF is unlikely to produce the same benefits for all.
To promote equitable access to healthcare, PBF could
be combined with pro-poor targeting strategies and/or
community-based health insurance (CBHI). Thus far, em-
pirical evidence on the feasibility of combining PBF with
other supply- or demand-side interventions that address
social protection is scarce.
In LMICs, pro-poor targeting has been implemented
both on the supply side and the demand side. On the
supply side, one strategy is to pay healthcare providers
more for services offered to the poor compared to the
rest of the population [21]. On the demand side, one
pro-poor targeting strategy is to exempt the worst-off
from paying user fees. One challenge is the identification
of the poorest. Recent studies have shown that commu-
nity members can use selection procedures to identify
the poor [22-25]. Such participatory processes to identify
the poor has been found to be socially valued and effective
in rural areas, but less so in urban areas. The challenges of
pro-poor targeting strategies include conflicts of interests
of management committees, lack of knowledge about
policies, inability to travel in order to benefit from
the services, apprehensions of healthcare providers, and
diminished quality of care [26,27]. Rigorous studies on
pro-poor targeting strategies are very rare in Africa, result-
ing in a knowledge gap on their implementation processes
[26]. Thus far, no intervention or research program com-
bined PBF with a community-based selection of the poor.
On the demand side, CBHI could be combined with
PBF to increase risk sharing among the population.
Since the 1990s [28], several experiments in sub-Saharan
Africa have shown that CBHI membership facilitates ac-
cess to healthcare [29-31] and offers a degree of financial
protection [32-35]. However, participation in CBHI gen-
erally remains very low (10%–15% penetration rate [27]).
Access to CBHI is often not equitable because the poor-
est populations do not have the financial capacity to pay
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bers, the poor are generally unable to benefit from
healthcare coverage to the same extent as others due to
indirect costs or copayments [39,40]. Moreover, healthcare
providers often perceive the implementation of CBHI as a
threat to their personal interests [41-44], which has
important repercussions on the quality of services pro-
vided [45,46].
Although CBHIs have adopted a wide range of initia-
tives involving various stakeholders, none of them have
been able to resolve the issue of low membership on
their own [47]. To date, however, there have been no
studies on the combination of PBF with CBHI.
It is essential to produce evidence on the feasibility of
implementing combined interventions with synergetic
potential, as a means to address equity concerns related
to traditional PBF approaches. In Burkina Faso, the im-
plementation of various intervention arms combining
PBF with CBHI and pro-poor targeting offers a unique
opportunity to explore existing gaps in knowledge.
Study setting
In Burkina Faso, nearly half of the population lives below
the poverty line and more than 100,000 children under
the age of 5 die each year [48]. The probability that a
newborn baby will die before reaching the age of 5 is
102 per 1,000 [2]. The maternal mortality ratio is 400
per 100,000 live births [3]. In the poorest quintile, only
12% of women receive prenatal care at least four times
during their pregnancy, compared to 32% of women in
the richest quintile [49]. The percentage of births
attended by a skilled healthcare provider also ranges
widely from 19% in the poorest quintile to 84% in the
richest quintile [49]. With such important inequalities
in access to care [50,51], the health of the poorest
population is a concern.
In 2011, the Government of Burkina Faso launched a
pilot PBF intervention targeting maternal and child health-
care services in three districts. In 2012, the evaluation of
the pilot project [52] found a substantial improvement in
the quantity and quality of healthcare services provided
[52]. However, evaluators were not able to establish a
causal relationship between PBF and the outcome vari-
ables due to the study design. With regard to the imple-
mentation process, results highlight the importance of
ensuring that stakeholders are well informed, feel involved
in the process, and accept the rules relating to incentive
sharing. However, given the small scale of this evaluation,
it remains unclear how the different elements of the
PBF intervention, the context, and the stakeholders in-
volved influenced each other to affect the intervention's
effectiveness.
In 2013, the government decided to expand PBF to
12 districts in six regions, covering a population ofapproximately four million people. The operation is
financed by the World Bank and carried out by the
Ministry of Health's Technical Support Unit in charge
of PBF (TSU- PBF). The objective remains that of im-
proving the utilization and quality of maternal and
child healthcare services. In comparison to the earlier
pilot project, PBF will be combined with additional inter-
ventions directly targeting health equity: demand- and
supply- side pro-poor targeting and CBHI. The objective
of combining PBF with pro-poor targeting and CBHI is
to ensure that healthcare improvements are accom-
panied by adequate measures to enhance equity in uti-
lization rates and secure financial protection. Four
intervention arms are being implemented to compare
their outcomes:
– Performance-based financing only (PBF 1): Health
facilities are paid according to the quantity and
quality of healthcare services delivered. Patients
are required to pay user fees. PBF performance
agreements concluded between the MOH and the
health center define the package of basic services to
be provided and the indicators and targets to be
reached in delivering these services. The results
achieved against these targets are assessed by
external reviewers every 3 months. Based on these
verified results, each facility under a PBF contract
receives payments in partial reimbursement for the
services delivered. The payments are based on unit
prices, based on a number of factors designed to
achieve the desired results. This includes the basic
cost of the inputs required (and not financed
elsewhere) for services to be rendered, adjusted
for quality of the service. This intervention group
does not include any systematic targeting and
subsidization of the poor.
– Performance-based financing + systematic targeting
and subsidization for the poor (PBF 2): PBF is
combined with a community-based selection of the
poor (approximately 15%–20% of the population)
who are entitled to benefit from user fee exemptions.
A specific PBF indicator is introduced for purchasing
services for the poor, using a fixed unit price for each
consultation package (including services and drugs).
The fixed unit price is higher than for non-targeted
patients, taking into consideration the delivery of care
without direct payments from patients. If issues of
oversupply arise after the first few months of
implementation, a cap may be established so that a
maximum of about 10% of consultations can be
reimbursed as consultations offered to the poor.
In that case, health facilities would receive the
normal rate for consultations offered to the poor
exceeding the 10% cap.
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and subsidization for the poor + provider motivation
(PBF 3): PBF is combined with a community-based
selection of the poor who are entitled to benefit
from user fee exemptions (approximately 15%–20%
of the population). Healthcare providers are paid
more for services provided to the poor than in PBF
2. The multiplication factor varies depending on
the services. If issues of oversupply arise, a
reimbursement cap of about 10% may be established.
The higher reimbursement rate acts as a financial
incentive for healthcare providers to take personal
initiative to increase the utilization of healthcare by
the poorest households.
– Performance-based financing + community-based
health insurance (including targeting of the poor)
(PBF 4): PBF is combined with CBHI offered to the
general population. The insurance premiums of the
poor (approximately 15%–20% of the population)
are subsidized. Healthcare services are purchased at
varying payment levels, as defined in PBF 3 (with
higher payment levels for services provided to the
poor). Thus, subsidization of services provided to
the poor who do not pay the premiums will pass via
the PBF mechanism at budget-neutral levels, while
capitation payments will replace out-of-pocket
payments for the general population.
Primary healthcare facilities are randomly allocated to
the different groups. All district and regional hospitals
included will be allocated to PBF 2.
The theory of the overall intervention combining
PBF with pro-poor targeting and CBHI is presented in
Figure 1. As with any real-life intervention, these four
modalities (PBF 1, 2, 3, and 4) may be modified or adapted
in the future. Four of the six regions implement PBF 1,
PBF 2, and PBF 3; one region implements PBF 1 and
PBF 4; and one region only implements PBF 1.
The World Bank also finances the impact evaluation
of the four intervention arms. The impact assessment
adopts a blended experimental and quasi-experimental
design. For the experimental portion of the design, facil-
ities within PBF districts are randomly assigned to PBF
intervention arms to test the effects of the additional
components (pro-poor targeting - PBF 2 and 3 and
CBHI - PBF 4) versus PBF alone (PBF 1). For the quasi-
experimental portion, facilities are matched with other
facilities in neighboring control districts to compare the
effects of the intervention arms with the absence of any
intervention (counterfactual). Two comparison districts
in each of the six regions, where the intervention districts
will take place, have been selected to act as comparison
health facilities. The research protocol presented in this
manuscript is not for this impact evaluation. Our protocolfocuses exclusively on the implementation process and, as
such, adopts a design that is complementary to the one
used for the impact evaluation.
General objectives and research questions
The overall objective of this study is to analyze the emer-
gence, the fidelity, the implementation process, the sus-
tainability, the possibilities for scaling-up the intervention
arms nationwide, and the ethical implications of the inter-
vention arms. The research questions (Q) are:
 Q1. How was the decision taken to combine PBF
with CBHI and pro-poor targeting?
 Q2. Were the interventions' activities implemented
as planned and why?
 Q3. How do social actors perceive the interventions?
 Q4. How were the interventions implemented?
 Q5. What adaptation/invention/innovation strategies
did the interventions trigger?
 Q6. Did the interventions induce unintended
effects? If so, which ones?
 Q7. How did the different contexts shape the way
the interventions were deployed?
 Q8. Which specific activities or combination of
activities produced changes in the performance
of health centers? How were these changes
produced over time?
 Q9. Will the implementation process of the
interventions allow their sustainability?
 Q10. What is the potential for scaling-up the
interventions nationwide?




The current study is anchored in methodological pragma-
tism [53-55]. When evaluating public health interventions,
researchers are faced with complex and dynamic objects
that are composed of various intertwined actions. These
objects are often characterized by non-linear relations,
organized in specific contexts, and understood as open
systems that encompass the researcher [56,57]. For this
type of evaluative study [58], researchers must adopt a
pragmatic position to answer research questions and pro-
vide recommendations to decision makers [59].
Evaluability assessment
The methodological strategy was developed during a
pre-evaluative phase [60,61] which took place between
July and December 2013. Through literature reviews,
workshops, and dialogue with stakeholders, the evalu-
ability assessment phase provided a better understanding
of the interventions arms, their components, and their
Figure 1 The theory of intervention.
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and methodological strategy based on the knowledge
gaps, the theory of intervention [56], the available budget,
policy-maker needs, and a realistic timeline [62].
Types of evaluation
Several types of evaluations will be conducted as part of
this study. Examples of typical questions representing
each type of evaluation are presented in Table 1.
The assessment of emergence (Q1) will examine the
factors that led to the decision to combine PBF with
pro-poor targeting and CBHI. An analytical framework
derived from the multiple streams approach will be used
to understand public policy agenda setting [63].
Assessing the fidelity of implementation (Q2) is essen-
tial because stakeholders plan to implement a combin-
ation of interventions that they believe to be effective.
But in order to be effective, the interventions must be ei-
ther implemented as planned (to avoid type 3 errors
[64]), or the changes/innovations brought about must be
beneficial. The evaluation of fidelity compares the activ-
ities that were initially programmed with those that were
implemented (content fidelity), as well as their level of
achievement (fidelity of the temporal and geographical
coverage) [65-67].
The assessment of processes (Q3–7) will focus on the
internal dynamics of the intervention arms, the roles, per-
ceptions and coping strategies of actors, the unintended
effects, the evolution of actions, and the mediating effect
of the context [68,69]. We also seek to understand localdynamics, the relationship between healthcare providers
and the populations, the local history, and the socio-
historical context that could affect the performance of
primary healthcare centers (PHC) and district or regional
hospitals, as well as other processes. We will also examine
the adaptation processes, which may be essential to the
interventions' effectiveness [66,68].
The performance assessment (Q8) will focus on activities
related to the interventions in PHC and district or regional
hospitals. It is related to an effectiveness analysis. Primary
healthcare centers and hospitals will be considered to be
effective when they are better than others (median) and
they improve their score on indicators associated with the
interventions' activities.
The sustainability assessment (Q9) [70] will focus on
three types of events that help achieve different levels of
sustainability [71,72]: i) specific to sustainability (stabiliza-
tion of resources and organizational risk taking); ii) jointly
related to sustainability and to the implementation of
the interventions (incentives for actors, adaptation of ac-
tivities, alignment of objectives, transparency of communi-
cation, shared cultural artifacts, integration of rules); and
iii) specific to the implementation (sufficient resources
and compatibility with the host institution).
The conditions to potentially scale-up the interven-
tions (Q10) will be studied by examining the characteris-
tics of the innovation (e.g., combining PBF with CBHI
and pro-poor targeting), the context, the host organization
(Ministry of Health), the implementation strategy, and the
support team (TSU-PBF, World Bank) [73].
Table 1 Examples of research questions for each evaluation type
Types of evaluation Examples of research questions
Emergence - How was the problem of accessibility and performance recognized?
- What were the debates surrounding the potential solutions?
- What motivated the choice to select these intervention arms instead of others?
- What were the positions of the different actors involved in the adoption of these intervention arms?
Performance - Did the performance change in the different levels of health facilities? If so, why?
- Were the performance objectives met since the beginning of the intervention arms?
- Did the utilization rate of healthcare services change for the general population or vulnerable groups?
- Did the quality of healthcare services change for the general population or vulnerable groups?
- Did the level of motivation of health professionals change?
Fidelity - Were the activities regarding the training of health professionals, the contracts, the monitoring, the
payments, the user fee exemptions, and the CBHI implemented as initially planned?
- Were any of these activities added, modified, or omitted?
Processes - How do stakeholders perceive the implementation of the intervention arms?
- Which factors facilitated or hindered the implementation of the intervention arms?
- What are the unintended processes and effects caused by the intervention arms?
- How did the intervention arms influence governance, management, monitoring, and leadership within the healthcare system?
- How did the intervention arms influence interpersonal relations, communication, and collaboration between stakeholders?
- How did the intervention arms influence the practices, behavior, and motivation of healthcare providers?
- How did the intervention arms influence the available resources, medical supply, and the infrastructure?
- How do the different components of the intervention arms interact?
Ethical considerations - What are the ethical considerations related to the intervention arms?
- How was the community involved in the implementation of the intervention arms?
- How do stakeholders perceive the process of identification of the poorest that is conducted by the community?
Sustainability - Which human, material, and financial resources necessary for the intervention arms' activities were integrated in the district's budget?
- Were the intervention arms adequately adapted to the context? Are they compatible with local practice?
- Is the implementation of the intervention arms in line with the priorities of the health authorities?
- Is there a cultural relation between the intervention and the stakeholders (e.g., rituals, symbols)?
- Did the interventions influence the healthcare system?
- How were the rules and procedures institutionalized?
Scale-up - How were the stakeholders that can contribute to a scale-up of the intervention arms implicated? Are they
favorable and committed to a scale-up?
- Do the intervention arms respond to a recurrent and persistent problem?
- Do the contexts in which the intervention arms were tested reflect the rest of the country?
- Could the human, material, and financial resources be mobilized to scale-up the intervention arms?
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involve analysis of the moral and political issues associated
with the design and implementation of the intervention
arms. The goal is to go beyond ethical considerations
traditionally associated with procedural ethics in order
to examine a wider scope of ethical implications pertinent
to the interventions.Case studies
The design will be a longitudinal multiple case study
with several nested levels of analyses [74-77].Selection of the context for case studies
Since the social context and the district teams' leadership
affect the performance of the PHC in Burkina Faso
[76,78,79], case studies will be conducted in 3 of the 12
districts. The sample size takes into account our resource
constraints but is sufficient to represent a variety of
contextual situations conducive to the process of analyt-
ical generalization [80]. Six of the 12 districts had to be
removed from the potential case studies because they do
not represent the normal context of the healthcare system.
Given the constraints and the need to select districts in dif-
ferent regions, the three selected districts are Diébougou
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region), and Solenzo (in the Boucle du Mouhoun region).
Selection of contrasted cases
The cases will be PHCs representing different interven-
tion arms and the district or regional hospital located
within each of the three selected districts. Figure 2 illus-
trates the selection of cases within each district. The
total number of cases will be 18 PHCs (out of a potential
106 PHCs) and three hospitals (n =21 cases). More
specifically, in Diébougou and Ouahigouya, where three
modalities are implemented (PBF 1, PBF 2, and PBF 3),
we will select two PHCs for each of the three interven-
tion arms. In Diébougou, we will also select the district
hospital (DH). In Ouahigouya, we will select the regional
hospital (RH) because there is no district hospital. In
Solenzo, where only two intervention arms have been
implemented (PBF 1 and PBF 4), we will choose six PHCs,
that is three for each of the two intervention arms, and
the district hospital.
The selected cases will be considered to be typical
cases [80]. For each intervention arm, we will choose the
two or three most contrasted cases in terms of their
initial performance (good, fair, poor) before the start of
the interventions. We will define performance in relation
to key activity indicators: number of births attended by
a skilled healthcare provider, vaccination coverage, and
number of preventive and curative consultations. We
will assess the initial performance of each PHC over theFigure 2 Selection of cases within each district.24 months preceding the intervention implementation.
Based on a participatory approach with Health District
Team member, we will select the PHC with the most con-
trasted performance scores using graphic reading and ac-
cording to computed mean initial performance scores. The
hypothesis of effectiveness and equity is the same for all
PHCs, regardless of the initial performance. Thus, this case
selection procedure follows the principal of “literal replica-
tion” whereby each case predicts similar results [80].
Data collection
This evaluative research will adopt a mixed methods
approach [81]. We will give more weight to the qualitative
data collection (QUALI) compared to the quantitative data
collection (QUANT). The temporality and the type of data
collected for the different types of evaluations are pre-
sented in Figure 3.
During the first month (M1) of the study, we will
measure the initial performance levels of the PHCs to
allow the selection of cases. Our previous work in Burkina
Faso and that of other researchers have demonstrated the
quality of the routine data [76,77,82,83]. We will also
organize a pilot case study in each district [80].
Three months (M3) after the beginning of the study,
we will collect data to measure the fidelity of the inter-
vention arms' implementation and to understand the
process of implementation. Under the supervision of a
researcher in each district, research assistants will be
present in each case for a 2-week period. This relatively
Figure 3 Timeline for the quantitative and qualitative data collection.
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the stakeholders, but also provide a better understanding
of the contextual issues. On site, research assistants will
conduct non-participant observation (e.g., at the health
centers, in the villages). They will keep research diaries,
take notes after informal interviews, and make ethno-
graphic [84] summaries. The research assistants will begin
formal data collection only during the second week in
order to take into account the context and also the social
dynamics by meeting important people. Research assis-
tants will conduct in-depth interviews until we reach sat-
uration of the data (at least 30 interviews) with key local
stakeholders. This analysis (M3) will offer an opportunity
to understand the performance of the PHC before the
beginning of the interventions (Figure 3).
After 6 months (M6), a qualitative data collection
round will be conducted on a national level to better
understand the factors that contributed to the emer-
gence of PBF with pro-poor targeting and CBHI. We will
collect data from all of the available documentation and
from approximately 20 in-depth interviews with key
stakeholders. In-depth interviews will be conducted until
we reach saturation of data.
After 12 months (M12), a second data collection phase
will take place in all of the selected healthcare facilities.
In terms of performance, quantitative data will be col-
lected using the same method as in M1. However, with-
out waiting for the results of these analyses, we will
conduct in-depth interviews with healthcare providers
and members of the management committee to capture
their perceptions of the evolution of this performance.
Following the same method used during M3, we will
analyze the evolution of the fidelity of the implementation
and the processes using document analysis, observations,
and in-depth interviews. In addition, the sustainability and
conditions to potentially scale-up the intervention armsnationwide will be studied through interviews conducted
on a national level. We will conduct interviews until we
reach saturation of data (approximately 30 interviews)
with stakeholders.
At 18 months (M18), after analyzing the quantitative
data on the evolution of the performance, research assis-
tants will conduct a final 2-week field visit in each case.
They will conduct interviews with key stakeholders to
discuss and understand the quantitative performance
data. Not only will we try to understand how the inter-
ventions are organized at M18 but, due to preliminary
data analysis of M3 and M12, we will also conduct in-
terviews on the evolution of the implementation and
potential explanations for the challenges, modifications,
and difficulties. We will also conduct the assessment of
ethical considerations during this phase.
Each case has a specific historical, social, environmen-
tal, and political context as well as relations between the
populations and healthcare providers. The temporal di-
mension of these relations is essential to understand, as
the intervention arms will certainly bring about changes
that will evolve over time [74,77]. The method adopted
to collect data should be able to face this challenge.
Analysis of case studies
The in-depth research strategy and use of multiple
sources of evidence [76] reinforce the internal validity of
the 21 case studies. We will organize the inter-case ana-
lyses as a stepwise process. After their field trips, each
assistant will prepare a monograph of each case and a
cross-sectional analysis of the intervention arm. We
will conduct a quantitative analysis of the change in
the performance of health centers by comparing the
mean performance from the 24 months preceding the
intervention with the mean performance obtained 1 year
after the intervention. Then, each researcher will conduct
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principal investigator will analyze the 21 cases globally.
For each of these steps, researchers will be able to move
to a higher level of analytical generalization [82]. This
collective process, illustrated in Figure 4, will strengthen
the validity of the conclusions.
A preparatory workshop between researchers (M1) will
ensure a common understanding of concepts, analytical
framework, and data collection strategy. An expert will
give a workshop on the NVivo software to the research
staff in order to establish a common platform for the data
analyses throughout the study. We will record, transcribe,
and code all interviews. We will conduct content analyses
[83,85]. We will organize collective analyses (workshop at
M6 and M15).
Ethics
There are no constraints or restrictions weighing on the
autonomy and independence of the study or the publica-
tion of its results. Ethical committees in Burkina Faso and
at the University of Montreal Hospital Research Center
(CRCHUM) have approved the study. The study's objec-
tives are aligned with Burkina Faso's national priorities.
The Ministry of Health and donors have requested an
evaluation of the four intervention arms. We will inform
all relevant stakeholders and authorities about the purpose
of the study and the presence of research assistants on the
field. We will not disclose the performance of selected
cases to the participants. We will obtain oral or written
informed consent from the participants depending on
their literacy level.Figure 4 Description of the general synthesis of results.Trial status
The study is financed through the first author's (VR)
programmatic research funds allocated by the Canadian
Institutes of Health Research (CIHR). The data collection
will begin during summer 2014. The data cleaning or ana-
lyses will not have begun at the time of submission of this
protocol.Discussion
An important strength of this protocol rests in its rigor-
ous design. Langley et al. [86] have argued that process
evaluations tend to adopt deceptively simple designs that
rely on cross-sectional qualitative or ethnographic data.
Many studies focus on only one level of analysis and fail
to look at the evolution of the implementation process
over time. For this study, we have adopted a longitudinal
multiple case study with several nested levels of analysis.
This study will collect real-time qualitative and quanti-
tative data over a period of 18 months. We explicitly
incorporated temporal progressions to help understand
the intervention arms' complete life cycles, from their
emergence to the conditions that may affect their sustain-
ability. The prolonged involvement of researchers will
allow them to be close to events and practices. Moreover,
we will examine ongoing interactions among different
groups of individuals and across multiple levels of health-
care provision. The study of PBF in higher level healthcare
facilities is novel in Africa and responds to a knowledge
gap. Overall, this complex study design will make a signifi-
cant contribution to the field of health financing in LMICs
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Moreover, the context in Burkina Faso provides a
unique opportunity to examine the interactional imple-
mentation process of combined interventions. This study
has been designed so that we can disentangle and com-
pare the distinct contributions of PBF, pro-poor targeting,
and CBHI. This will allow us to understand the added
value of each component.
As with any population health intervention research,
various methodological and operational challenges are
likely to arise during the course of this study. One diffi-
culty will be to avoid or control for the implementation
of other studies or interventions overlapping with our
area of interest. Health needs in Burkina Faso are urgent,
so a number of prominent international health agencies
are intervening with their own agendas or priorities at
stake. The lack of coordination between all the actors
makes it difficult to select cases with the assurance that
no other confounding study or intervention will affect or
contaminate our sample. Potentially confounding factors
will be handled on a case-by-case basis, for example
through negotiation with other stakeholders and adapta-
tion of methodological strategies. Our close ties and
constant communication with the country's Ministry of
Health, funders, and local stakeholders will allow us to
remain well informed throughout the study in order to
take appropriate measures in a timely fashion, if needed.
Another limitation of this study will be the difficulty in
establishing a causal chain between the inputs, the pro-
cesses, and the results. Inferring causality for interventions
implemented in a real-life setting is more complex, but on
the positive side, results tend to be more pertinent for
decision making. Another concern for this study is that
multiple stakeholders have been directly implicated in the
implementation of the interventions and may have vested
interests in its promotion. Although the perceptions and
strategies of the actors are part of the object of the present
study, we must be wary of the possibility that participants
may introduce biases in the study. Overall, we will try to
strengthen the validity of the results by using multiple
sources of data and varied methods of data collection
and analysis.
This evaluation study will promote the utilization of
the results. Throughout the study, the research team will
collaborate with key decision makers and stakeholders
to ensure that the research questions are pertinent and
that the results will be useful for evidence-based decision
making. This collaboration will flourish without influen-
cing the scientific independence of research. We will or-
ganize workshops to plan the study and share results
locally. We will disseminate the results using reports,
policy briefs, and lay publications distributed in French
and in English. These will also be shared on our webpage(www.equitesante.org). Moreover, we will present the re-
sults in local and international conferences. Lastly, we will
publish scientific articles in open access journals to pro-
mote access to the findings.
Conclusion
Independent evaluations of PBF in LMIC are rare and
mainly examine impacts. To date, little research has
helped to understand issues related to the implementa-
tion process and the coping strategies of actors that are
at the heart of complex interventions. Moreover, it is
urgent to clarify how PBF can be combined with other
approaches to promote equitable access to healthcare
services. The implementation of interventions with high
synergistic potential in Burkina Faso provides a unique
opportunity to respond to the existing knowledge gap.
In this article, we have presented a comprehensive proto-
col that aims to study the emergence, the fidelity, the pro-
cesses, the sustainability, the conditions that can influence
scaling-up, and the ethical considerations of four interven-
tion arms that combine PBF with pro-poor targeting and
CBHI. The complex mixed methods design will allow
researchers and decision makers to understand the evolu-
tion of these approaches over time. Ultimately, the scien-
tific evidence produced should be used to promote access
to high-quality healthcare for vulnerable groups.
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